--- Am. Tribal Law ----, 2026 WL 2729781 (Ho-Chunk)
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Ho-Chunk Nation Supreme Court.

In the INTEREST OF Minor Child(ren): [REDACTED], DOB [Redacted], [Redacted], DOB [Redacted]

Case No.: SU 26-03
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FILED SEPTEMBER 14, 2026

Tr. Ct. Case Nos.: JV 24-02 & 03

ORDER (Reversal)

On June 8, 2026, appellant Ho-Chunk Nation Child and Family Services (CFS), by and through Department of Justice Attorney Nicholas M. Layland, filed a timely Petition for Permission to Appeal in response to the Trial Court’s order dated May 27, 2026. Order (Child Prot. Review Hr’g), JV 24-02 & JV 24-03 (HCN Tr. Ct. May 27, 2026) [hereinafter First Child Prot. Review Hr’g]. CFS argues that jurisdiction terminated in the child protection cases when the children turned 18 years of age and that the Trial Court misapplied subsection 108 of the Hocąk Nation Children & Family Act [hereinafter Children’s Act]. Because [Redacted] and [Redacted] have each reached the age of majority, we reverse the Trial Court’s order and declare the child protection cases are closed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 17, 2025, the Trial Court held a child protection review hearing in this matter. On May 27, 2026, the Trial Court issued a written order for the December 17, 2025 hearing. However, in the interim, the Trial Court held a second child protection review hearing on May 21, 2026. A Status Report was filed by the appellant on May 14, 2026, reporting that both [Redacted] and [Redacted] were set to graduate on May 22, 2026, and that [Redacted] was now 18 years of age. The appellant specifically noted that it would not be exercising its discretion to continue jurisdiction. Status Report, JV 24-02 & JV 24-03, at 2 (May 14, 2026); Appellant’s Br., SU 26-03, at 2 (July 13, 2026).

At the May 21, 2026 child protection review hearing, the appellant verbally motioned for termination of both cases due to [Redacted] and [Redacted] achieving the age of majority. The Trial Court verbally denied the motions, primarily relying on the lack of written motion and citing subsection 108 of the Children’s Act. The written order memorializing the May 21, 2026 hearing was issued on July 9, 2026, and states in relevant part:

The Court explained that it could schedule a Termination Hearing under 4 HCC § 3.108, in anticipation of CFS submitting the required documentation proving that the minor children did in fact graduate and in anticipation of DOJ filing a motion or motions for termination.... Attorney Naquayouma made a verbal motion to terminate jurisdiction over [Redacted]. The Court reviewed the requirements under the CHILDREN’S ACT 4 HCC § 3.108 and noted that it still needed certified copies of the children’s final grades and diploma, which could be filed with the written motion for termination.... Attorney Naquayouma made a verbal motion to terminate the case involving [Redacted]

Order (Child Prot. Review Hr’g) JV 24-02 & JV 24-03, at 3, 4, 6 (HCN Tr. Ct. July 9, 2026) [hereinafter Second Child Prot. Review Hr’g].

In both written orders, the Trial Court states “This Order shall remain in effect for an indeterminate period of time, in accordance with the CHILDREN’S ACT § 3.108a, unless the parties document earlier completion of the dispositional requirements.” Id. at 7; First Child Prot. Review Hr’g at 6. The Trial Court also ordered copies of the minor children’s high school diplomas and a transition plan.1 First Child Prot. Review Hr’g at 7.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court possesses the constitutional authority “to interpret and apply the ... laws of the Ho-Chunk Nation,” and may render binding “conclusions of law.” HCN Const, art. VII §§ 4.7(a). When reviewing questions of law, the Court employs a de novo standard of review, meaning that it examines a matter anew. Hope B. Smith v. Ho-Chunk Nation et al., SU 03-08, at 5 (HCN S. Ct. Dec. 8, 2003).

DECISION

The Court shall have the authority to issue all Orders necessary to ensure child safety. 4 HCC § 3.7a(l). Once the Trial Court exercises its jurisdiction under the Children’s Act, its authority continues until such time as it may be terminated pursuant to subsection 3.7. Specifically, “jurisdiction obtained by the Court of a child under this Act shall continue until the child becomes eighteen (18) years of age or the case is dismissed or the underlying Order expires; at which time the continuing jurisdiction of the Court shall terminate.” Id. § 3.7d (emphasis added).

Jurisdiction may be extended in limited instances, including:

The Court, pursuant to the discretion of Children and Family Services, shall continue jurisdiction until the date on which the child is granted a high school diploma or the date on which the child reaches 19 years of age, whichever occurs first, if the child is a full-time student and is reasonably expected to complete the program before reaching 19 years of age.

Id. § 3.7a(3)(e) (emphasis added). Here, the appellant opted not to extend jurisdiction pursuant to their discretion under the statute.2

Moreover, motions to terminate are governed by subsection 108, which provides that an order vesting rights in an individual or agency remains in effect for an indeterminate period. Id. at § 3.108a. “The Court, upon motion of a party seeking termination of an Order and being satisfied all parties were properly notified of the motion, may schedule a hearing to consider termination of its Order. After hearing the parties, if the Court finds that continuation or renewal is necessary to safeguard the welfare of the child or the public interest, the Court shall enter its findings and reasons for denying the motion for termination.” Id. at § 3.108b.

The Trial Court, however, erred by interpreting this provision to require a motion for termination even after its jurisdiction had already expired. When a court’s jurisdiction terminates by operation of law, its legal authority ceases automatically. In this case, jurisdiction over both [Redacted] and [Redacted] ended when they reached the age of 18 because the appellant declined to extend jurisdiction under subdivision 3.7a(3)(e). [Redacted] turned 18 on [Redacted] and [Redacted] turned 18 on [Redacted]. Because the appellant did not exercise its discretion to extend jurisdiction, the Trial Court’s authority over and [Redacted] expired automatically on their respective eighteenth birthdays.

Mandating a motion to terminate under these circumstances is legally futile, as it purports to compel a party to seek the dissolution of an order that has already expired and improperly requires the court to exercise authority it no longer possesses. Accordingly, the order of the Trial Court is reversed and the child protection cases for [Redacted] and [Redacted] are closed.

EGI HESKEKJET, Dated this 14th day of September 2026.

All Citations
--- Am. Tribal Law ----, 2026 WL 2729781

Footnotes
1	These additional requirements lack a legal basis. A plain reading of subsection 3.7 of the Children’s Act confirms that no such requirements exist.
2	This Court recently decided a similar case. See In the Interest of Minor Child [Redacted], SU 26-01 (HCN S. Ct. July 27, 2026) (“The Legislature delegated to CFS the authority to request continuing jurisdiction for individuals over 18 who have not graduated high school yet, stating with particularity ‘pursuant to the discretion of Children and Family Services.’ Consequently, the Trial Court lacks the legal power to override or usurp that prerogative.” (citation omitted)).